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I. INTRODUCTION
The motivation to write this essay derives from a chapter I wrote
for Matthew Bender on adult entertainment zoning law.' The subject
sounded interesting, and it was, but in the course of my research, I was
pulled into the debate (intellectually and emotionally) between the rad-
ical feminists, the First Amendment liberals, and others on the issue of
pornography.2 I read articles on all sides, and it was fascinating read-
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. B.S., 1978;
J.D., 1981; LL.M., 1987; University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. With special thanks to
Professors Michael Ariens and John Schmolesky for their insights and to Luis Garcia for his
research assistance.
I. See 2 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROL § 11 (1988).
2. It has been said that Susan K. Brownmiller's comments on pornography in her book
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975), initially opened the debate between femi-
nists and liberals on a solution to the "pornography problem." See TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, 30-34
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ing, but I still was not sure then and am not sure now where I come out
on this subject, except that I am inclined to favor a feminist point of
view. I believe, however, that this is a fundamental and important is-
sue, and that the discussion can help illuminate the debate in other
areas involving civil liberties, such as hate speech. And so, I write this
essay, which is about the confusion and the conflict between two ideals
that I value, and my efforts to resolve them.
As a child (quite literally) of the 1960s and the early 1970s, I was
well trained in the classic liberal philosophy that the marketplace of
ideas is the best way to test and ultimately to eliminate or defeat those
ideas that are wrong, evil, or simply misconceived. In many ways I
agreed with the author who said that "[p]ornography seeks out soci-
ety's rawest nerve, and then presses on it," and then went on to argue
that this was a valuable and perhaps even necessary enterprise. 3 I also
understood, at least on an intellectual level, the argument of an ACLU
lawyer that pornography is "speech that needs and deserves protec-
tion."4 On the other hand, I consider myself to be an ardent feminist of
a certain type. When I read parts of the 1986 Attorney General's Com-
mission Report on Pornography, I felt sick. I was disgusted by the
graphic descriptions of sexually explicit pictures, movies, and books
found in the report and in some of the feminist literature. I argued with
my husband (normally a man who is sympathetic to feminist issues)
about the harmlessness of so-called mainstream or softcore pornogra-
phy magazines and about the legitimacy of the existence of strip shows
in "gentlemen's clubs" here in San Antonio.
At the heart of this entire debate is the lack of understanding or
agreement of what it is that we are attempting to regulate. We as a
society do not agree about what pornography means, what is hardcore
or softcore, what is obscene, or what is "adult." The terms themselves
send different messages to the audience that is evaluating them. For
example, one author cites a study where people were asked whether
they would support a law banning sexually explicit or X-rated videocas-
settes. They were also asked if they would support a ban on porno-
graphic videocassettes. Almost twice as many of those polled would opt
to ban "pornographic" materials, since the term appears to have a vio-
(Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
3. See Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as
Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1628 (1988).
4. See Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission:
New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27, 48 (1986).
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lent connotation.5
My ultimate conclusions are two-fold. First, I think that we have
the ability, under current law, to limit or prohibit the most potentially
harmful forms of pornography (e.g., kiddie porn, violent porn, "snuff"
films). We can use current obscenity standards, or enact zoning regula-
tions or new ordinances and statutes, to deal with specific "problem"
areas. However, I do not believe that current available solutions are
sufficient to deal with the problem of pornography. Debate about sexu-
ally explicit speech tends to break down-along gender lines. While
this is not always true, it is true so often that we should consider
whether there is something about the nature of the "beast" (pornogra-
phy) that makes it a lightning rod for feminist anger and liberal male
defensiveness. I conclude that we, as a society, need to question our
standards and our methods of evaluating pornography. We need to spe-
cifically include the female perspective of sexually explicit speech, in a
way that has not been done in the past.
In this article, I present an analysis and critique of both the cur-
rent constitutional standard on obscenity and a sampling of the pro-
posed liberal modifications of the standard. I then describe and critique
the radical feminist view of pornography, particularly with respect to
the proposed "pornography as a violation of civil rights" ordinance.
Part IV is a description of what the current pornography market is
like-what is out there. Part V presents some proposed solutions to the
problems posed by the more deviant forms of pornography, particularly
violent pornography. In that section, I also argue that the ultimate an-
swer to many of the issues that pornography raises lies in a thoughtful
consideration and implementation of a feminist view in analysis of the
"rights" associated with sexually explicit speech.
II. WHAT THE LIBERAL VIEW IS AND WHY IT FAILS
I consider the "liberal" view to take one of two basic forms. One is
the current system, which allows pornography to be produced, exhib-
ited, and sold, (with a few notable limitations, which will be discussed
below) except when it crosses over the line into obscenity. The other is
5. See John B. McConahay, Pornography: The Symbolic Politics of Fantasy, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 35-36 (1988). In the survey, 32% would ban "x-rated video cassettes for
home viewing." However, 60% would ban "pornographic cassettes for home viewing." Also, 62%
and 56% would ban cassettes featuring "violent pornography" and "sexual violence" respectively.
See also Gloria Steinem, Erotica and Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference reprinted in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 35 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
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a more open system, and these advocates argue that all sexually ori-
ented speech should be subject to the protection of the First Amend-
ment. In this section, I will describe these systems in more detail and
explain why I believe that they fail us as a society.
A. The Current System
The present legal rules for dealing with issues of obscenity have
their roots in Roth v. United States.' In Roth, a 1957 case, the United
States Supreme Court held that obscenity is without "redeeming social
importance" and thus is not within the protection of the First Amend-
ment. The decision in Roth was foreshadowed fifteen years earlier in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 7 when the Court stated in dicta that
obscenity played "no essential part" in the marketplace of ideas and
that it was of "slight" social value.8 The Roth decision was ground-
breaking, since it established two fundamental concepts for the future
of obscenity law (and First Amendment jurisprudence in general): one,
that obscenity, although a type of speech, was not protected speech;
two, that the Court was willing to make value judgments about the
morality, and thus the inherent worth, of speech.'
In the wake of Roth, the Court struggled with several obscenity
cases. Justice Stewart wrote one of the truest statements ever penned
about this issue when he indicated that he could not define obscenity,
but "I know it when I see it." 10 The problem had indeed become one of
defining obscenity. The Court finally established a test in 1973, in
Miller v. California.1 This rather cumbersome test provides that a
work is obscene if the following factors are present:
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, finds that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; and
(2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
6. 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). The Roth decision was subsequently modified. A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413
(1966). In Memoirs, the Court rules that sexually explicit material was not obscene unless it was
"utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 419.
7. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
8. Id. at 571-72.
9. See Simon Roberts, The Obscenity Exception: Abusing the First Amendment, 10 CAR-
DOZA L. REV. 677, 681-83 (1989). See also Bruce A. Taylor, Hard Core Pornography: A Propo-
sal For a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255, 256-60 (1987-88).
10. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
II. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
458 [Vol. 14:455
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sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and
(3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 12
The present rules have been roundly criticized in a variety of ways.
The Miller test can be attacked on the very practical ground that it
requires case by case determinations of obscenity. Each item, whether a
book, a video, a magazine, or some other media form, must be evalu-
ated separately under the traditional standard. 3 This can be time con-
suming, expensive, and cumbersome. Others argue that the current
standard is deficient because there is no real, discernible, or justifiable
difference between obscene and nonobscene pornography."' The test es-
tablishes an either-or proposition: either sexually explicit material is
completely protected and may be sold, distributed, or exhibited without
significant limitation, or it is obscene and may be completely prohib-
ited. An item may be "saved" from obscenity status if we can find any
sort of serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific value.' Moreover,
what is obscene in one place may not be obscene in another. This is not
rational First Amendment jurisprudence, at least in the traditional
sense of constitutional law. 6
The liberal camp finds fault with the Miller test on a more funda-
mental level. They fail to see any legitimate justification for the exclu-
sion of obscenity from the protection of the First Amendment. Their
scholarship tends to start by attacking some of the asserted legal, theo-
retical, and historical bases supporting the current exception for
obscenity.
One of the basic principles that the Supreme Court obviously ad-
hered to in Roth, Chaplinski, and Miller is that the law may act to
suppress speech that is immoral, and that the "judiciary is properly
concerned with protecting society's particular notions of morality."' 7
This principle is itself challenged. It is argued that the current test
gives the majority or the dominant societal group the right to impose
their views of what is or is not obscene on the minority. 18 Also, the
12. Id, at 24.
13. See Wendy Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment: Prior Restraints and
Private Action, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 241, 243-44 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
14. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 9, at 722-23.
15. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U.
MICH J.L. REF. 55, 63 (1987-88).
16. See Gey, supra note 3, at 1579.
17. Gey, supra note 3, at 1568.
18. See Gey, supra note 3, at 1568-70.
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principle is based in history and in common law, at a time when reli-
gion, morals, and legal rules were in fact closely intertwined. 19 How-
ever, in more recent decisions in the First Amendment and other areas,
the Court appears to recognize this truth and to try to make decisions
based on more modern and secular principles.2"
Professor Frederick Schauer, Chairman of the 1986 Meese Com-
mission on Pornography, is a leading proponent of the view that the
obscenity exception can be justified by drawing a distinction between
reason or intellect on the one hand and passion or feeling on the other.
According to his theory, only communication designed to reach the
human intellect is protected under the First Amendment, and this is in
accord with the fundamental underlying purpose of the First Amend-
ment. 2' As one author put it, "Because pornography goes straight to
the genitals without passing through the intellectual processes it is bet-
ter characterized as sex than speech."22 In Schauer's view, pornogra-
phy lacks the communicative aspect necessary for speech to enter the
realm of protected speech. This approach is criticized as creating an
19. See Gey, supra note 3, at 1566-70 for a discussion of the history of obscenity law;
Roberts, supra note 9, at 684-87; and McConahay, supra note 5, at 51-53.
20. Barry Lynn, an ACLU lawyer, cites Supreme Court decisions both protecting nude
dancing, Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), and the wearing of a jacket with
the words "Fuck the Draft" written on it, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970). He also cites
lower court cases protecting other types of "speech." Lynn, supra note 4, at 57-58. The Court's
decision in the area of family, marital, and individual privacy seemed to move away from histori-
cal notions of morality. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state may not
prohibit prescription of contraceptives to married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (state may not prohibit distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state may not prohibit woman's right to an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (state may not limit minor's right to abortion to parental consultation or con-
sent). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (state may prohibit homosexual sodomy).
Another area where the Court has, in a series of decisions, moved away from history and tradi-
tional morality to modern, secular policies is in the gender-based discrimination cases. Compare
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (state may deny woman a license to practice
law because of divine ordination of male-female roles) with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(state could not arbitrarily prefer male as administrator of intestate estate); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (state could not permit higher age requirement for sale of beer to males than to
females).
21. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982);
Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech" Obscenity and "Obscenity:" An Exercise in the Inter-
pretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). Schauer's thesis has roots in
scholarship by John Finnis, who drew a line between reason and passion. Reason, which was
important to the Framers, would be protected, but passion would not. See John M. Finnis, "Rea-
son and Passion". The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
222 (1967).
22. Deana Pollard, Regulating Violent Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REV. 125, 135-36 (1990).
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artificial distinction between emotion and intellect, one that is impossi-
ble to accurately draw. The mind-body link is so strong that it cannot
be said that the intellect is not involved in the sexual stimulation result-
ing from pornography.23
Moreover, both the civil libertarians and the feminists would argue
that pornography is certainly speech, since it (at a minimum) attempts
to transmit ideas about sexual pleasure and excitement. In fact, most
commentators would argue that pornography is not only communica-
tive in nature, but that it is also inherently political. I will return to this
point shortly.
Another foundational pillar of the Roth-Miller test is the idea that
speech can be structured into a hierarchy and that political speech, at
the top of the pyramid, is all that the First Amendment is designed to
protect. According to this theory, obscenity is not excluded from consti-
tutional protection on moral grounds, but because it is not political in
nature. 4 This theory is sometimes attacked as an overly narrow read-
ing of what the First Amendment is, or should be, about. The concept
of free speech, although perhaps originally intended to protect against
prior restraint of political speech, should not be so limited today. This
is really just a version of the "original intent of the Framers" versus
"present political and social reality" argument in jurisprudential and
constitutional analysis.25 I am not sure that the Court was actually us-
ing this theory when it developed the current obscenity test, but it is
certainly implicit in the language of these and other First Amendment
decisions that there are indeed certain levels of speech and that some
types of speech are "higher" or more "worthy" of complete protection
than others.2"
As indicated earlier, many commentators would disagree that por-
23. See id.; Lynn, supra note 4, at 58-62; Roberts, supra note 9, at 710-16.
24. The two leading political speech theorists are Alexander Meiklejohn, who conceived the
theory, and Robert Bork, who carried it to an extreme. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
25. For some criticisms of the political speech argument, see Roberts, supra note 9, at 704-
08. Richard Posner wrote an entertaining essay about originalism in Bork and Beethoven, 42
STAN L REV. 1365 (1990).
26. The typical example is commercial speech. The Court has held that many types of com-
mercial speech are excluded from the protection of the First Amendment. The doctrine was cre-
ated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) and most recently reaffirmed in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). For a discussion of the commercial
speech doctrine see J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J.M. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.26 et. seq.
(1986, 1988 Supp.).
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nography is not political in nature. The entire radical feminist argu-
ment against pornography is that it constructs the reality of the way
men and women relate to each other, and more specifically, defines the
parameters of their power relationship. They argue that pornography is
an ideology and an act of male domination, leading to female subordi-
nation.2 7 Other feminists adopt the "liberal" view and argue that sexu-
ally explicit speech is in fact political speech.28 For example, such
speech can be self-affirming for sexual minorities and can communicate
ideas of sexual rebellion or exploration.2 9 Other political ideas attrib-
uted to pornography include the endorsement of sex for pleasure, the
release (in an acceptable manner) of male hostility toward women, a
release of sexual tension generally, the advocacy of changes in life-
styles or attitudes, and political or social parody. 30
Those who would defend the current system might argue that
when the obscenity laws are enforced, or racketeering statutes are used,
to impound adult materials or when zoning powers are used effectively
to contain or disperse adult entertainment, then pornography is in fact
controlled.31 Some evidence supports this proposition.3 2 However, this
satisfies neither the liberals nor the feminists as a legal resolution of the
problem, although it may well satisfy local residents and civic leaders.
From the liberal viewpoint, the scattered elimination of adult materials
from the marketplace is an unconstitutional deprivation of the right of
those who wish to obtain and enjoy them. From the feminist viewpoint,
27. See generally, Dworkin, supra note 15; ANDREA DWORKIN. PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POS-
SESSING WOMEN (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not at Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. &
POLY REV. 321 (1984); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
28. See, e.g., Hunter & Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce,
et. al., in American Booksellers Assn v. Hudnut, 21 U.MIcH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-88).
29. Id. at 120-21.
30. See Gey, supra note 3, at 1628-30; Lynn, supra note 4, at 48-56. For cases upholding
"parody" of a sexually explicit nature see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988);
Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Ault v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988); Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988).
31. See McConahay, supra note 5, at 66-69; see generally Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indi-
ana, 109 S.Ct. 916 (1989) (RICO case); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (up-
holding nuisance closure statute as applied to adult bookstores); City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning cases); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See also ROHAN, supra note
I.
32. See Lynn, supra note 3, at 42-43, nn 58-60; Taylor, supra note 9, at 257, n. 7. Both
articles cite success in eliminating or reducing the availability of pornographic materials in a few
cities including Arlington, Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Norfolk, and Omaha.
462 [Vol. 14:455
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such limited measures just push the pornography outside the city lim-
its, or into an adjoining state. The existence and availability of pornog-
raphy does not change; it is simply moved to a new location. The evil of
pornography, in the feminist view, is that it is available at all, since it
warps society's view of the way men see women (and perhaps the way
women see themselves).
B. Liberal Modifications and a Critique
The classic liberal solution to the problems created by the present
system is to abolish all (or nearly all) restrictions on sexually explicit
speech. The scholars proposing such a remedy usually attack the cur-
rent obscenity exception as being unjustified and unjustifiable under
First Amendment analysis. The arguments for that position are out-
lined above.3
3
One author suggests the adoption of what he calls a "radical skep-
ticism" model for dealing with pornography. 4 Unlike many other "lib-
eral" authors, he concedes that pornography has its own vision of the
world-a basically negative one. He characterizes pornography as anti-
social, hostile, narcissistic, and libidinous.3 5 Why protect it then? Be-
cause, in his view, censorship is a dangerous concept. Radical skepti-
cism posits that absolute knowledge is unknowable, that truth is
hypothetical, and that all theories or ideas are subject to revision. The
only way to make sure that such revision and modification take place is
to prohibit suppression of speech in any form.3 6
Another author complains that Stanley v. Georgia3 7 contains the
only reasonable discussion of obscenity law in recent Supreme Court
history .3 He argues that a principle of neutrality needs to be the guid-
ing light and that all speech, including pornography, should be pro-
tected absolutely and equally. 9 Stanley held that a person could not be
criminally prosecuted for the possession of obscene materials in his or
her own home. The Court found that the defendant had a privacy right
in his own home, that the government should not attempt to control the
33. See supra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
34. See Gey, supra note 3.
35. Gey, supra note 3, at 1628, 1630.
36. See Gey, supra note 3, at 1622-23 for an explanation of radical skepticism and 1626-34
for an explanation of how the theory applies to pornography.
37. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
38. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 723-28.
39. Roberts, supra note 9, at 727-28.
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moral content of a person's thoughts, that it was not possible to draw a
line between ideas and entertainment, and that restriction of First
Amendment rights was not the way to control crime, but rather the
state must use education and enforcement of the criminal law. ' The
author argues that Stanley is consistent with the Miller-Roth line of
reasoning. The Court held in Stanley that the state was engaged in
impermissible thought control. This at least implies that obscene speech
does have some communicative aspects. The Court attempted to draw a
distinction between public and private distribution and use of the mate-
rial, but the author finds that distinction to be indefensible.4 '
A third author approaches the problem from a completely differ-
ent perspective and defends pornography itself.42 He points out that the
large market for pornography shows that millions of people do enjoy
it.43 He argues that it has some of the benefits outlined above: release
of hostility, education, self-fulfillment, and legitimation of one's own
sexual experience. "4 This author believes that much of the political, so-
cial, and legal debate about pornography excludes many of those most
affected-the "hard-core" consumers of the "hard-core" stuff. The
elimination of pornography will not deal with the people whose
problems or socioeconomic status make them antisocial, lonely or hos-
tile, and possibly big users of pornography.4 5
The rhetoric is different, but the song remains the same:46 let all
ideas, media, depictions, et cetera, into the marketplace, and in the
end, the ultimate truth will win out, whether that "truth" is the expan-
sion of the use and enjoyment of sexually explicit materials or a public
outcry of horror at the content of the material and the subsequent use
of other legitimate law- and market-based means to deal with the issue.
I think whether you agree with this line of reasoning at least par-
tially depends on whether you believe that the making of and the very
existence of pornography is seriously harmful to all of those involved in
40. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969).
41. Roberts, supra note 9, at 724-27.
42. See Lynn, supra note 4, at 48-56.
43. Lynn, supra note 4, at 30-31. See also, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 1, 31 (1985); Note, The Civil Rights Pornogra-
phy Ordinances-An Examination Under the First Amendment, 73 Ky. L.J. 1081 (1984-85) (es-
timate of seven billion dollar a year industry).
44. Lynn, supra note 4, at 48-65.
45. Id. at 118-25.
46. THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME is the title of a concert film made by Led Zeppelin in
the 1970s.
[Vol. 14:455
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observing or in making it and to society in general. Many people be-
lieve that much of the "hoopla" surrounding pornography (i.e., child
pornography, snuff films, violent pornography, the role of pornography
in crime, etc.) is greatly exaggerated. However, this is where I think
the liberal view fails us. Pornography is no different than any other
type of speech and should be subject to the same protections, unless it
is true that it causes direct and serious harm to certain members of
society. There is certainly some evidence that women and children are
exploited and abused through the pornographic mill. This issue is dis-
cussed below in more detail.47
The "pure" liberal or classic liberal view is, in any event, a white,
middle or upper middle class, overwhelmingly male view.' If men were
depicted in the same way as women and children are depicted in most
of the available pornography, I cannot help but believe that there
would be a different attitude about this issue.
III. WHAT THE RADICAL FEMINIST VIEW Is AND WHY IT FAILS
In this section, I will present a discussion of the now infamous civil
rights ordinance that was the subject of the Hudnut case and will also
discuss some of the other radical feminist ideas about pornography.
This section will also outline some of the major criticisms that have
been leveled at the radical feminist view.
A. The Civil Rights Ordinance
The foundational concept of this ordinance is that pornography is
itself a violation of every woman's civil rights.
The ordinance has been controversial since its creation. It was
drafted in 1983 by two women: Catharine MacKinnon, a professor at
the University of Minnesota Law School, and Andrea Dworkin, a very
47. See infra notes 110-17.
48. In one study cited in an article, those most opposed to a ban on pornography were
nonreligious men with postcollege education. McConahay, supra note 5, at 62. Women are over-
represented in the scholarship criticizing the current system of obscenity law. In fact, the only
"article" written by women that I came across supporting the "pure" liberal view was the FACT
brief. See Hunter & Law, supra note 28. See also Laura Lederer, "Playboy Isn't Playing," An
Interview with Judith Bat-Ada; Robin Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape;
Susan Griffin, Sadism and Catharsis: The Treatment Is the Disease, Andrea Dworkin, Why So-
Called Radical Men Love and Need Pornography; Susan Lurie, Pornography and the Dread of
Women: The Male Sexual Dilemma; Beverly LaBelle, The Propaganda of Misogyny; all in TAKE
BACK THE NIGHT 121-78 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (all discussing the misogynist nature of
pornography).
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prolific feminist writer, teacher, and speaker.49
The ideology behind the ordinance is explained well by MacKin-
non in her articles and speeches. Basically, the theory is that pornogra-
phy is a political, not a moral, issue."0 Pornography is not an idea; it is
an ideology and an act of male domination, resulting in female subordi-
nation. Pornography constructs the way we see ourselves in society, and
women "live its [pornography's] lie as reality."5 In the feminist per-
spective, gender inequality is, in large part, the result of the way men
see women. In MacKinnon's writings, pornography is the way men see
women: as objects, as desirous of being used, violated, and possessed.
Since this is the way men see women, this is all that women are permit-
ted to be by the dominant male culture. It is crucial to this perspective
that, because this view created by pornography is so pervasive, the ordi-
nance cannot be viewpoint-neutral. 52 As MacKinnon states:
Pornography is a harm of male supremacy made difficult to see be-
cause of its pervasiveness, potency, and, principally, because of its
success in making the world a pornographic place. Specifically, its
harm cannot be discerned, and will not be addressed, if viewed and
approached neutrally, because it is so much of "what is." In other
words, to the extent pornography succeeds in constructing social real-
ity, it becomes invisible as harm. If we live in a world that pornogra-
phy creates through the power of men in a male dominated situation
the issue is not what the harm of pornography is, but how that harm
is to become visible. 53
Thus, the general theory was that pornography violates the civil
rights of all women, since it promotes a harmful view of women. The
ordinance makes four "harms" or injuries actionable. First, the ordi-
nance made "trafficking" in pornography actionable. This included the
production, sale, distribution, or exhibition of pornographic materials.
This is perhaps the heart of the ordinance, since it has a very broad
sweep. It defined trafficking in pornography as discrimination against
women. Second, if the pornography models are coerced into participat-
ing in pornographic productions, then the resulting materials may be
49. See David Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 CONST.
COMMENTARY 147, 148 (1985). Dworkin is the author of PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING
WOMEN (1979).
50. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321
(1984).
51. Id. at 335.
52. See MacKinnon, supra note 43.
53. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 20.
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removed from public view. Third, those persons who have pornography
forced on them in employment, education, a home, or any public place
may file a complaint against the person who did the forcing. Fourth, it
provides that if any person is attacked or assaulted as a result of por-
nography, that person has a claim against the attacker, as well as the
maker, seller, distributor, and exhibitor of the pornography.5
54. The text of the proposed Minneapolis ordinance can be found in Bryden, supra note 49,
at 181-89. The four actionable injuries were:
A. Discrimination by trafficking in pornography. The production, sale, exhibition, or
distribution of pornography is discrimination against women by means of trafficking in
pornography:
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public
university and college libraries in which pornography is available for study,
including on open shelves, shall not be construed to be trafficking in pornog-
raphy but special display presentation of pornography in said places is sex
discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of trafficking
in pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy to violate the
civil rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting against
the subordination of women. Any man or transsexual who alleges injury by
pornography in the way women are injured by it shall also have a cause of
action.
B. Coercion into pornographic performances. Any person, including transsexual, who is
coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced (hereafter, "coerced") into performing for
pornography shall have a cause of action against the maker(s), seller(s), exhibitor(s) or
distributor(s) of said pornography for damages and for the elimination of the products
of the performance(s) from the public view.
(1) Limitation of action. This claim shall not expire before five years have
elapsed from the date of the coerced performance(s) or from the last appear-
ance or sale of any product of the performance(s), whichever date is later;
(2) Proof of one or more of the following facts or conditions shall not, with-
out more, negate a finding of coercion:
(a) that the person is a woman; or
(b) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(c) that the person has attained the age of majority; or
(d) that the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone in-
volved in or related to the making of the pornography; or
(e) that the person has previously had, or been thought to have had,
sexual relations with anyone, including anyone involved in or related
to the making of the pornography; or
(f) that the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures
for or with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the
making of the pornography at issue; or
(g) that anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given
permission on the person's behalf; or
(h) that the person actually consented to a use of the performance
that is changed into pornography; or
(i) that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events in
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The ordinance drew an odd combination of support from feminists
and conservative religious groups. 55 The city of Indianapolis passed the
ordinance, but as discussed below, it was struck down by the Seventh
Circuit. The Minneapolis City Council twice passed the ordinance, but
it was twice vetoed by the mayor. Similar versions of the ordinance
have been considered in Los Angeles, Detroit, and other municipalities.
The city of Cambridge, Massachusetts rejected such an ordinance by
referendum.5"
In 1985 the Seventh Circuit decided American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut. 57 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed, with some Jus-
tices dissenting. 58 In Hudnut the city of Indianapolis enacted the civil
rights ordinance, which defines pornography as the "graphic sexually
explicit subordination of women."'59 The court held that this definition
question was to make pornography; or
(j) that the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate ac-
tively in the photographic sessions or in the sexual events that pro-
duced the pornography; or
(k) that the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a
willingness to cooperate in the production of pornography; or
(1) that no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the mak-
ing of the pornography; or
(m) that the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
C. Forcing pornography on a person. Any woman, man, child, or transsexual who has
pornography forced on him/her in any place of employment, in education, in a home, or
in any public place has a cause of action against the perpetrator and/or institution.
D. Assault or physical attack due to pornography. Any woman, man, child, or
transsexual who is assaulted, physically attacked or injured in a way that is directly
caused by specific pornography has a claim for damages against the perpetrator, the
maker(s), distributor(s), seller(s) and/or exhibitor(s), and for an injunction against the
specific pornography's further exhibition, distribution, or sale. No damages shall be as-
sessed (1) against maker(s) for pornography made, (2) against distributor(s) for por-
nography distributed, (3) against seller(s) for pornography sold, or (4) against exhibi-
tors for pornography exhibited prior to the enforcement date of this act.
Bryden, supra note 49, at 184.
55. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 4, at 27.
56. Lynn, supra note 4, at 28 n.5; Rebecca Benson, Note, Pornography and the First
Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 154-55 n.6.
57. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor would have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral
argument.
59. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324. The Indianapolis ordinance defined pornography as:
the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words,
that also includes one or more of the following:
A. Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
B. Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
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in this ordinance violated the First Amendment because pornography is
protected speech, even if unpleasant to some in society. The court anal-
ogized pornography to other controversial types of speech: seditious li-
bel,"0 racist publications of the Ku Klux Klan, 61 and the Nazi march
through Skokie, Illinois."2 Judge Easterbrook's opinion accepted the
city's primary justification for the ordinance as a fact: pornography af-
fects thoughts, and the subordination of women in pornography leads to
subordination of women generally in society. However, the opinion in-
dicates that this simply illustrates the power of pornography as
speech.63
The court rejected the city's other arguments for upholding the
ordinance. First, there was no evidence that models or actors were ac-
tually injured in the process of producing pornographic films or pic-
tures. Second, the argument that pornography as speech is "unanswer-
able" (i.e., cannot be debated in an effective way so the "truth" cannot
emerge) was irrelevant in First Amendment terms. The courts have
never permitted the government to define truth as to a particular issue
and then to cut off all further debate about the issue. Third, the court
C. Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
D. Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
E. Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual; or
F. Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, viola-
tion, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of ser-
vility of submission or display.
Indianapolis Code § 16-3(q). The statute also provided that the "use of men, children,
or transsexuals in the place of women in paragraphs (A) through (F) above shall also
constitute pornography under this section.
Id.
The Minneapolis ordinance had a similar definition, but added some provisions to the general
definition, including:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities. or
(v) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and but-
tocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature.
Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-14 (1985).
60. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. Brandenburg v, Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
62. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
63. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
found that even if pornography were low-value speech and thus subject
to more stringent regulation, this ordinance attempts to define pornog-
raphy by the viewpoint of the speech, not by creating a more general
category of impermissible speech. In other words, the city might be
able to achieve its goals, but not through the implementation of view-
point-based regulation of speech. 6"
Easterbrook's opinion is interesting in two ways: first, he fre-
quently cites to scholarly and policy-oriented law review articles in con-
sidering the First Amendment issues; second, he includes a section in
the opinion discussing ways that an ordinance such as the one in the
case could be rewritten to be constitutional.6 5 For example, one sugges-
tion is that the offense of coercion to engage in a pornographic per-
formance (by force or fraud) could be constitutional if made viewpoint-
neutral. The offense of forcing pornography on unwilling recipients
could be acceptable if the government were not acting as a censor. The
section creating remedies for injuries or assaults attributable to pornog-
raphy is salvageable, according to the opinion, since speech that is dan-
gerous in and of itself can be controlled. 6 However, the ordinance, as it
exists, ties the action to viewpoint-specific harms and is still
unconstitutional.
Not surprisingly, the ordinance has many critics, all arguing that
the ordinance is unconstitutional. Most of the attacks focus on First
Amendment law, arguing that the ordinance goes too far in prohibiting
speech, that it prohibits the dissemination of ideas, and that it is vague,
overbroad, or a prior restraint.6 7 Others argue that it was not within
the original intent of the framers to prohibit this type of speech, 8 that
alternative remedies to the perceived harms are available through ex-
64. Id. at 330-32.
65. Id. at 332-34. In fact, the concurring justice objected to the gratuitous commentary in
the opinion. Id. at 334.
66. For example, see the "fighting words" doctrine established by Chaplinski v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
67. See, e.g., Thomas 1. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Pro-
fessor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & PUB. POL'Y REV. 130 (1984); Gey, supra note 3; Lynn, supra
note 4; Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.
OF L & PUB. POL'Y. 461 (1986); Randall D. B. Tigue, Civil Rights and Censor-
ship-Incompatible Bedfellows, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81 (1985). But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (agreeing that antipornography leg-
islation may be constitutional under traditional analysis).
68. This argument is made by Emerson, supra note 67, at 132. MacKinnon would respond
by saying that the framers didn't intend anything about women's speech, since women didn't cross
their minds. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 68.
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isting tort and contract law doctrines,69 and that it violates equal
protection.7"
In fact, some very vocal opponents of the MacKinnon ordinance
are also feminists. Their view is highly critical of the ordinance because
it totally denies that women, as well as men, may actually enjoy sexu-
ally explicit entertainment.71 Some of these individuals are very promi-
nent in the women's movement: Betty Freidan, Susan Estrich, Del
Martin, and Elizabeth Schneider all cosigned the amicus brief submit-
ted by the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT) in the Hudnut
case.
72
In defending the ordinance, MacKinnon makes several arguments.
First, she criticizes the existing system for evaluation of sexually ex-
plicit speech:
Feminism doubts whether the average gender-neutral person exists;
has more questions about the content and process of defining what
community standards are than it does about deviations from them;
wonders why prurience counts but powerlessness does not, and why
sensibilities are better protected from offense than women are from
exploitation; defines sexuality, and thus its violation and expropria-
tion, more broadly than does state law; and questions why a body of
law which has not in practice been able to tell rape from intercourse
should, without further guidance, be entrusted with telling pornogra-
phy from anything less. 71
In other words, MacKinnon questions whether the current system
is competent to evaluate the complex issue of whether sexually explicit
speech should be banned. Moreover, she is troubled by the fact that the
present system reflects the existing pornography market and (if the
radical feminist vision of pornography is correct) that pornography
shapes the way men see women. Since this is reflected in the legal sys-
tem, then the current legal system must certainly "buy into" the porno-
69. Gey, supra note 3, at 1600; Lynn supra note 4, at 103.
70. Tigue, supra note 67, at 101. Tigue argues that since the ordinance would exempt cer-
tain libraries, it violates equal protection.
71. See, e.g., McConahay, supra note 5, at 40-42; Benson, supra note 56, at 155 n.7.
72. See Hunter & Law, supra note 28, at 77-78. Estrich is the author of REAL RAPE
(1987). Del Martin and Elizabeth Schneider have both done writing in the area of battered
women and the law. See DEL MARTIN. BATTERED WIVES (1976), Elizabeth Schneider, Equal
Rights to Trial for Women., Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV.
623 (1980).
73. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 21.
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graphic vision of women, at least at some level."
MacKinnon also attempts to distinguish obscenity from pornogra-
phy. She claims that obscenity is an idea, a thought, an abstract con-
cept of law. On the other hand pornography is more active; it is a polit-
ical practice and a concrete manifestation of reality. As a result of this
distinction, she believes that the theoretical "law" of obscenity cannot
deal with the real-world consequences of pornography. It is simply in-
capable of making that leap from idea to action, from concept to politi-
cal and social reality.5
On the other hand, she also defends the proposed civil rights ordi-
nance as being constitutional under existing law.76 She argues that the
proposed ordinance is simply a new version of an old, and legitimate,
legal theme of establishing sexual equality. 7  The harms of pornogra-
phy directly affect women, not men, and any societal benefits arising
from pornography are far outweighed by these harms. 78 She points out
that this is in line with current First Amendment jurisprudence: fight-
ing words 79 and group libel, 80 for example, may be restricted because of
the dangers associated with such speech. The same should be true here,
in her view, because this is an area where more speech is not necessa-
rily better, nor does it bring us closer to some idea of "truth" since
pornography's perhaps greatest harm is the silencing of women's
speech.81
The radical feminist view goes beyond the civil rights issue. The
radical feminists of today attack the entire modern male-female sexual
relationship as being violative of women. As Robin West points out, in
74. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 20; MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 335-37.
75. MacKinnon supra note 43, at 20-22, 65-67; MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 321-23. This
is the main point of the article in Yale Law and Policy Review-pornography is a political, not a
moral, issue.
76. See MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 26. "[1]t is important to understand that this ordi-
nance cannot now be said to be either conclusively legal or illegal under existing law or precedent,
although I think the weight of authority is on our side." Id.
77. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 25-27.
78. She identifies four "harms" resulting from pornography: harm to the performers (objec-
tification and silence); harm to those who are the unwilling recipients of pornographic messages
(sexual harassment and psychological damage); harm to those who are physically assaulted (i.e.
raped) as a direct result of male exposure to pornography; and the harm to society as a whole
resulting from the negative attitudes about women that are created and reinforced through expo-
sure to pornographic imagery. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 32-60. This issue of harm is dis-
cussed in more detail in section IV, infra.
79. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
80. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
81. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 63-68.
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the 1960s radical feminists concentrated on pregnancy, which was seen
as invasive, oppressive, and as an assault on the integrity of the female
body. Radical feminists of the 1990s see heterosexual intercourse in the
same way.8" For example, Andrea Dworkin considers every single act
of heterosexual intercourse to be coercive and intrusive. 83
B. A Critique of the Radical View
In this section, I will not discuss the traditional First Amendment
critiques of the civil rights ordinance, which tend to focus on such is-
sues as the original intent of the framers, or whether the ordinance is
vague, overbroad, and so forth. 84 Instead, I will discuss the larger pol-
icy questions that the radical feminist view raises.
First, I think the authors of the ordinance engaged in a valuable
enterprise just by raising the issue of pornography as a civil rights
question.85 The ordinance cannot be dismissed out of hand. The Hud-
nut case has been incorporated into standard textbooks and casebooks
on constitutional law.' Many leading scholars have written articles
criticizing the ordinance.8" People now know and talk about the issue.
Also, I personally agree with many of MacKinnon's ideas about the
nature of our law as a male-dominated structure (at least in practice)
and the differences between obscenity as an idea and pornography as
reality.
82. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-35 (1988).
83. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 22-24 (1981).
In the chapter on power, she indicates that the connotation of the very word "sex" has been
narrowed so that it means only "what the male does with his penis," rather than all of what it
could conceivably encompass.
84. For authorities raising these arguments, see supra notes 67-72. See also Pollard, supra
note 22.
85. This point is made in Christina Spaulding, Anti-Pornography Laws As A Claim For
Equal Respect: Feminism, Liberalism & Community, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 128, 150 (1988-
89).
86. American Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) a/f'd without
opin., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Texts and casebooks include the following: BARRETT & COHEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988 Supp. 347); BARRON, DIENES, MCCORMACK & REDISH, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 1039-40 (1987); BRAVEMAN & BANKS. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 1169 (1987); GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1127 (12th ed. 1991); LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHAPER & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 784 (7th ed. 1991), (1990 Supp. 209); NOWAK, ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 n.82
(4th ed. 1986); STONE. SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN & TUSHNET. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I138f (1986),
(1989 Supp. 198, 204); TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861, 921, 1028, 1058 (2d ed.
1988).
87. See the articles cited supra notes 67-72.
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The radical feminist view is vulnerable to several significant criti-
cisms, however. First, as one colleague at least implicitly said to me, it
may not be wise to put all of our feminist "eggs" into one basket. Por-
nography, I will state, is a serious and important issue for the feminist
movement. On the other hand, the civil rights ordinance (and radical
feminism generally) tends to paint with too broad a brush. Much of
what the ordinance prohibits would encompass well-known and classic
works of art and literature, for example.8 8 There is little or no chance
of accomplishing the goal of eliminating the distribution or exhibition
of such works. I do not think the political price, in terms of both credi-
bility and energy, is worth the effort. There is no chance that people
will stop having heterosexual intercourse or that women will stop hav-
ing babies until we get these dominance, equality, social, cultural and
legal issues worked out.89 Again the price is not worth it.
Second, (and this is also basically a political argument) I think it
should give feminists of all sorts, but particularly the radical feminists,
pause to consider which other groups in society supported the civil
rights ordinance-fundamentalist, conservative groups. 90 These people
usually have no interest in supporting (and usually oppose) feminist
approaches to other crucial women's issues, and the fact that they do
advocate this aspect of the feminist agenda should direct us to re-ex-
amine it. Are they advocating what is in actuality a misogynist view?
Is the civil rights ordinance a return to a paternalistic protectionist
view of women? I will return to this point below.
In a related vein, it may be unwise to pit the feminist agenda con-
cerning pornography directly against the standard, traditionally liberal
voices since it splits apart the coalition of those who do usually support,
advocate, and work for feminist causes. As mentioned previously, this
issue not only separates liberal men from the feminists, but it also di-
vides the feminists themselves. 91 To the extent that one hopes to actu-
ally accomplish social and legal changes such political concerns should
not be irrelevant.
Third, one author raises what she calls the "false consciousness
88. See the authorities cited supra note 67.
89. See the summary of the radical feminist view of pregnancy and intercourse in West,
supra note 82, at 29-36 (1988).
90. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 4, at 27-29, 37-48.
91. See supra note 72. As Professor McConahay points out, one study found that those
most opposed to a ban on pornography were nonreligious men with some postcollege education.
See McConahay, supra note 5, at 62. These are likely to be men who are "liberal" and somewhat
sympathetic to feminist causes, in my view.
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dilemma."92 The dilemma is that some members of the oppressed
group may be so enmeshed in the ideology of the dominant group that
they fail to see that they are in fact oppressed. Thus, some women (or
all women) may be so caught up in the male dominance that they can-
not speak with their own unique voices-each voice is only part of (or
heavily influenced by) the dominant culture. On the other hand, if you
take this view too far, all any woman has to say is part of the male
culture, and there is nothing else to work with.9" For example, many
women defend pornography, arguing that women will learn to enjoy it
and to use it to fully experience their own sexuality when given a
chance to do so."' A radical feminist might answer this by saying that
such women are just buying into the values and ideas of the dominant
(male) culture and are not thinking independently, or from the "true"
woman's perspective."6 I think that the radical feminists are frequently
guilty of arguing in this logically infinite loop.
Finally, the most important concern, in my opinion, about the rad-
ical feminist view is its almost inherent misogyny. In a thoughtful and
well-written article, Professor Jeanne Schroeder points out, "Although
it is surely not their intent, by disparaging heterosexuality and preg-
nancy in patriarchal society without the development of a positive al-
ternative, they run the risk of elevating the rare radical ... feminist at
the expense of further belittling the vast majority of women who will
engage in marriage and in motherhood.19 6 Her article is an interesting
and unusual one, in that it relates medieval stereotypes of women to
modern feminist ideas. Her main thesis is that historically, characteris-
tics that are valued in society are attributed to men, or are considered
masculine; qualities that are considered to be inferior are attributed to
women, or are considered feminine in nature. She points out that in
medieval times, connectedness and a sense of community were male
values in a hierarchical, male dominated society. Women were thought
to be "individualistic, selfish, cunning, and sexually voracious." 97 These
words sound remarkably like the mirror image of Carol Gilligan's ideas
92. See Spaulding, supra note 85, at 145-49.
93. Spaulding, supra note 85, at 145-49. Spaulding presents some other authors who have
discussed the idea of false consciousness. The lightning rod for her criticism is Catherine MacKin-
non, as the leading scholar in dominance theory.
94. See, e.g., the FACT brief, Hunter & Law, supra note 28.
95. See Spaulding, supra note 85, at 145-49.
96. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1213 (1990).
97. Id. at 1155.
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about men and women. In her vision, women are concerned with con-
nectedness and community; men are the individualistic, selfish ones.98
Schroeder also discusses the medieval development of the concept
of a virginal feminist or a virago, a surrogate man. This was a heroi-
cally virtuous woman, one who rejected sex, marriage, and childrearing
- all of which were considered to be degrading to women. The ideal-
ized virginal woman was elevated above other women, and she was
used "to justify the degradation and the humiliation of the vast major-
ity of women who could not become viragos."99
If all of this sounds familiar, I think that it is. Although Schroeder
admits that her analysis has its limits, I find the connection to modern
radical feminism to be striking. It is frightening and grossly unfair to
ask the majority of women to do what the radical feminists are, in a
sense, asking them to do. As Schroeder points out, even mainstream
feminism is somewhat unfair to the majority of women, who cannot or
will not forego marriage and childrearing in our present society in the
interest of career, academics, or general principles."' 0
Moreover, the radical feminist view is basically a man-hating posi-
tion. The radical feminists, in the same breath, will accuse men of hat-
ing women and of failing to account for the interests, thoughts, feel-
ings, and desires of one-half of the population in our legal and cultural
systems and will then advocate a theory of sexual and social relations
between men and women that promotes a similarly negative view of
men.
IV. MYTHS AND REALITIES OF PORNOGRAPHY-HOW BAD IS IT?
In 1970, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, ap-
pointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, found that exposure to por-
nography was basically harmless and may in fact have some positive
effects on sexuality.1"1 Sixteen years later, the Meese Commission came
98. See generally, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) and West, supra note
96, at 15-28 (explaining and critiquing difference theory or "cultural" feminism).
99. See Schroeder, supra note 96, at 1208. This concept arose from orthodox Catholic
dogma glorifying the Virgin Mary. Id. at 1208-13.
100. Id. at 1213.
101. See James Magee, Book Reviews, 6 CONST. COMM. 507, 508 (1989); McConahay,
supra note 5, at 56-57. See also Irene Diamond, Pornography and Repression: A Reconsideration
of "Who" and "What," in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 187, 192-93 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980). Dia-
mond points out that the 1970 Commission appeared to ignore a finding by a 1969 President's
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that media violence does tend to increase
aggressive behavior.
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to some very different conclusions about pornography, particularly vio-
lent pornography, and its effects. The 1986 Commission, officially es-
tablished by Attorney General Edwin Meese, found that exposure to
violent sexually explicit materials led to more aggressive attitudes to-
wards women and thus increased sexual violence.102
Many explanations for the differences in the reports have been ad-
vanced. The political climate (and feminist attitude) of 1970 was very
different from that of 1986. The political orientations of the members
of each committee and of the men appointing the committees were at
opposite ends of the spectrum. The budget for the 1970 report was two
million dollars, while the budget for the 1986 report was only four hun-
dred thousand dollars, making it virtually impossible for the Commis-
sion to do independent research.10 3
However, one of the most fundamental debates about the dispari-
ties in the reports and subsequent recommendations is whether the sex-
ually explicit material of 1986 was intrinsically different from that of
1970. It is clear that sexually explicit material of all forms is more
available today than it was twenty years ago, largely because of the
growth and progress in technology. The advent of the video recorder
has revolutionized the market for "adult" movies, and the variety of
cable television programming makes "adult" channels economically vi-
able.104 What is more questionable is whether these programs are more
violent and more "hard-core" in addition to being more available. 05
102. See U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY
FINAL REPORT 322-47 (1986) (hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT).
103. Magee, supra note 101, at 513. The members of the 1970 Commission were appointed
by President Lyndon B. Johnson. They were William B. Lockhard, Chair, Frederick H. Wagman,
Edward E. Elson, Thomas D. Gill, Edward D. Greenwood, Morton A. Hill, G. William Jones,
Charles H. Keating, Jr., Kenneth Keating (resigned June 1969), Joseph T. Klapper, Otto N.
Larsen, Irving Lehrman, Freeman Lewis, Winfrey C. Link, Morris A. Lipton, Thomas C. Lynch,
Barbara Scott, Cathryn A. Spelts, and Marvin E. Wolfgang. See Diamond, supra note 101, at
193.
The 1986 Commission was originally formed in 1985 by then Attorney General William
French Smith during the Reagan administration. It was publicly announced by Edwin Meese. The
members of the Commission were Henry E. Hudson, Chair, Judith Veronica Becker, Diane Cu-
sack, Park Elliott Dietz, James C. Dobson, Edward Garcia, Ellen Levine, Tex Lezar, Bruce Rit-
ter, Frederick Schauer, Deane Tilton, and Alan E. Sears, Executive Director. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 102, at 3-21.
104. Magee, supra note 101, at 512; McConahay, supra note 5, at 51; FINAL REPORT,
supra note 102, at 284-86.
105. See, e.g., Park E. Dietz & Alan E. Sears, Pornography and Obscenity Sold in "Adult"
Bookstores: A Survey of 5132 Books, Magazines and Films in Four American Cities, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF 7, 41-43 (1987-88). "Assuming that sexual violence, sexual degradation and sex-
ual humiliation are everywhere regarded as unwholesome and unhealthy, we conclude that a large
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This is further complicated by the fact that much of what we now con-
sider to be normal or standard entertainment fare is violent, but is not
pornographic or necessarily sexually explicit. For example, some au-
thors cite the popular "slasher" films as representing this phenome-
non.106 Scholars also debate whether "snuff" films (depicting the actual
torture and death of women for the viewer's sexual pleasure) actually
exist1 07 and whether the amount and availability of child pornography
is really on the rise.108
The Meese Commission did conduct a study of materials found in
adult bookstores in four major American cities. According to the re-
sults, approximately 13% of the materials depicted violence.10 9 The
number is not significant in and of itself, and no similar figure is availa-
ble for 1970. The actual amount and level of violence in such materials
is basically unimportant when we turn to slightly different issues and
ask what harm results from exposure to violent pornography, and if
harm does result, what should we as a society do about it?
Some specific harms are alleged to be directly associated with por-
nography. First, women (and perhaps children) may be coerced, either
implicitly or more explicitly, into participating in the creation of porno-
graphic films and photographs. 1 The Meese Commission report con-
tains some painful evidence of this type of coercion."' Snuff films, if
proportion of the 'adults-only' pornography market consists of unwholesome and unhealthy mer-
chandise according to any reasonable standard." Id. at 41. See also Taylor, supra note 9, at 259
("Today's adult videos are the same hard-core films previously available only in the industry's own
bookstores and theaters."); McConahay, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing that pornography is not
more violent).
106. Magee, supra note 101, at 512.
107. Apparently the term "snuff' film comes from a movie of the same name. The film
purportedly shows a young woman actually being stabbed to death and dismembered. The film is
described and discussed in Beverly LaBelle, Snuff-The Ultimate in Woman-Hating, Martha
Gever & Marg Hall, Fighting Pornography, both in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 272-85 (Laura Led-
erer ed., 1980). But see, McConahay, supra note 5, at 63-64 (arguing that snuff films "are the
Loch Ness Monsters of contemporary pornography" and do not exist).
108. Compare Jeffrey J. Kent & Scott D. Truesdell, Spare the Child: The Constitutionality
of Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornography, 68 ORE. L. REV. 363 (1989); Florence Rush,
Child Pornography, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 71-81 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (both arguing
that child pornography is a serious problem); with Lawrence A. Stanley, The child Porn Myth, 7
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 295 (1989); Lynn, supra note 4 at 106-08; McConahay, supra note 5
at 64-65 (arguing that it is not a significant issue).
109. Dietz & Sears, supra note 105, at 39-40.
110. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 32-37; Pollard, supra note 22, at 133; Sunstein,
supra note 67 at 595-97; Laura Lederer, Then and Now: An Interview With a Former Pornogra-
phy Model, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 57-70 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
11I. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 767-95 (general victim reports).
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they do exist, would also fall into this category of harm.
Second, there is some evidence that exposure to pornography leads
to sexually violent and abusive behavior.112 Third, exposure to pornog-
raphy, particularly violent pornography, affects the attitudes of both
men and women about sexuality and gender roles.113 This third harm is
the essence of the MacKinnon and Dworkin position, that pornography
itself entirely shapes the way men and women see each other in
society. 14
It is, of course, difficult or impossible to prove a direct link be-
tween the harms alleged and exposure to violent pornography. On the
other hand, the body of evidence supporting some sort of harm result-
ing from the existence of and the exposure to pornography is not insub-
stantial. Professor Sunstein, in writing on this issue, points out that the
evidence comes from three distinct sources-laboratory studies, victim
testimony, and statistics compiled by various states and other countries
on sex crimes and the variations associated with changes in the laws." 5
Studies show that exposure to pornography changes attitudes toward
rape (whether the victim deserves, encourages, or enjoys the experi-
ence; whether it is acceptable; and whether and how the crime should
be punished), and can result in more aggressive male-to-female conduct
generally. 6 Victim testimony dominated the hearings by the Meese
Commission. Victims came forward with very painful, horrific stories
about coercion to participate in pornographic works, as well as testi-
mony tending to establish a direct link between reading or viewing por-
nographic material and then committing crimes of sex and violence.1 7
Some -of this same evidence linking action to pornography is seen in the
112. See Pollard, supra note 22, at 131-33; Sunstein, supra note 67, at 597-99.
113. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Porno-Symbolism: A Response to Professor McConahay,
51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 74-76. Bartlett raises excellent points about the hidden aspects
of pervasive pornography: if women see something often enough, they will not think of it as un-
usual or unacceptable. See also Pollard, supra note 22, at 130-31; Sunstein, supra note 67, at
601-02; FINAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 799-835 (psychological and social harms of
pornography).
114. See supra notes 73-75, 82-83.
115. Sunstein, supra note 67, at 597-600.
116. In addition to the Sunstein article, such studies are discussed in Pollard, supra note
22, at 127-32; FINAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 901-1035 (discussing several studies of many
different aspects of harm); Pauline B. Bart & Margaret Jozsa, Dirty Books. Dirty Films and
Dirty Data, and Diana E.H. Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the New Research
Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 204-17, 218-38 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
117. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 773-95.
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victim testimony of battered women.118 As to statistics from states and
from other countries, Sunstein cites studies establishing a link between
an increase in reported rapes and the liberalization of pornography
laws, or the availability of pornography generally." 9
This evidence is criticized, however. It is argued that the link be-
tween exposure to sexually explicit materials and criminal conduct is
tenuous at best. 2 Critics of the Meese Commission argue that only
the testimony of victims was heard, not the viewpoint of those who en-
joy pornography in a peaceful manner. 2'
On the other hand, Professor Sunstein makes the excellent point
that we, as a society, often choose regulation over free enterprise in
areas where there is uncertainty, even in areas where fundamental lib-
erties are involved. He cites the example of the death penalty. Even
though we are uncertain as to the deterrent effect of this ultimate sanc-
tion, we nonetheless choose to employ it in certain cases.'22 On a more
mundane level, environmental regulations may require very low levels
of suspected carcinogen (or another dangerous substance) emissions,
even though such restrictions may have significant societal costs in
terms of jobs or product price.' 21
V. SOLUTIONS? VIOLENCE AND FEMINISM
A. Introduction
As I was writing this article, I was discussing it with a colleague.
At one point he said, "The whole thing [the issue of pornography] is a
0
118. See, e.g., Ann Jones, A Little Knowledge, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 179-84 (Laura
Lederer ed., 1980); L. Walker, TERRIFYING LOVE, 124-35 (1989).
119. See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 599.
120. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, A New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Violent
Materials Causes Sexual Violence, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1990); Hunter & Law, supra
note 28, at 112-18 (FACT Brief); Lynn, supra note 4, at 65-71; Tigue, supra note 67, at 112-13.
All authors basically argue that reliance on such studies is misplaced.
121. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 4, at 73-86.
122. See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 601 n.78.
123. See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 601 n.77. Environmental Law is constantly dealing
with this issue. See, e.g., Talbot Pate, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978-79); William H. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of
Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980); William D.
Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10190 (1984); Industrial Union Dept. v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (occupational exposure to benzene); National
Resource Defense Fund v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (vinyl chloride
emissions in air); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestos ingestion
via water).
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dead end. The liberal view is a dead end, the feminist view is a dead
end. I guess I'm just not that interested in it." The complacency and
the arrogance of the comment took me by surprise, although I'm not
sure why. We, like all academic institutions, certainly have more than
our share of arrogance and complacency. But it struck me that this is
indeed what is so frustrating about the whole issue. The bulk of the
American public does not care deeply about this issue and why should
they? As far as they can tell, pornography certainly doesn't affect
them. It probably does not directly affect my white, upper-middle class
colleague or his wife, mother, sisters, or children. On the other hand, I
do believe that pornography (violent or not) indirectly affects all of us,
whether we realize it or not, and so I feel compelled to propose some
sort of solution.
My solution is two-fold, one part more easily justified than the
other. First, I agree with other scholars that violent pornography can
be defined, and should be controlled, and I believe that this can be done
under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Second, this is an area
that I think (at least in part) is uniquely a woman's issue. This is the
tough argument, but I think it is worth making. There are some legal
questions that, in my view, are so closely and irrevocably bound to
women-their minds, bodies, and hearts-that only women, or those
embracing female values, can fully grapple with the issues. In this
view, we need to revamp at least some portions of the legal system to
accommodate the need for the feminine perspective in resolving these
fundamental issues.
B. Violence and Specific Solutions
It has never been disputed that certain types of speech are danger-
ous and need to be regulated. Pornography, particularly violent pornog-
raphy, may well be in that class. It has been suggested that we attempt
to deal with this issue by taking a compromise liberal position-use the
existing Brandenburg12" test, under which the government may regu-
late speech that advocates lawless action where there is intent to pro-
duce such action and there is an imminent threat of harm.'2 5 It was
stated above that there is some evidence that violent pornography has
been clearly linked to specific and particular harms, which result di-
124. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). See also Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (establishing a "clear and present danger" test).
125. 395 U.S. at 447.
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rectly from the exposure to such materials.' 26 The argument is that a
reasonable person would foresee that reading or viewing violent pornog-
raphy could lead the reader or viewer to engage in similar violent sex-
ual acts, and the threat that such conduct will occur is imminent. As
one author states, "Violent pornography, like speeding, is intrinsically
dangerous, and legislatures may regulate it on the basis of its known
propensity for harm without a showing of particular harm.' '1 27
Although this argument appears to be rational on at least some
level, I do not believe that the courts would use the Brandenburg test in
this fashion. The threat of sexual violence against women, resulting
from reading or viewing violent sexually explicit materials, was not the
type of issue that the test was designed to resolve. The Court seems to
require harm that is imminent and dangerous. Public anger or disquiet
would not be sufficient. 128
Another suggested solution is the creation of a new test or rule,
explicitly designed to deal with violent or hard-core pornography,
outside of the obscenity law altogether. This would be justified under
reasoning similar to that used by the Supreme Court to create a special
exception for child pornography in New York v. Ferber.'29 In that case,
the Court characterized child pornography as an "evil" and found that
when "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expres-
sive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion is required." 3 ' It is argued that violent or hard-core pornography
could be similarly restricted or prohibited, if defined in a narrow and
specific manner."'
This suggestion certainly has possibilities. The current Supreme
Court might be agreeable to such a limitation on rights of expression if
narrowly tailored. 32 The problem that some feminists would see is that
126. See supra notes 112-19.
127. Pollard, supra note 22, at 141.
128. See Tigue, supra note 67, at 111-13. Tigue cites Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973)
and Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) in support of his proposition.
129. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
130. Id. at 763-64. The court also gave other reasons for its decision: the State interest in
protecting children; the existence of kiddie porn is inherently related to child sexual abuse (in its
manufacture, if nothing else); the promotion and sale of child pornography encourages its produc-
tion; and it is unlikely, in the Court's opinion, that kiddie porn would pass muster under the
Miller obscenity standard. Id. at 756-63. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (kiddie
porn would tend to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
131. See Pollard, supra note 22, at 154-59 (proposing new ordinance).
132. The current Court has shown some willingness to limit First Amendment rights re-
garding speech. See. e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. Ill S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (upholding state
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most tests one could develop would be too narrow. For example, one
author suggests that we draw the line at depiction of "ultimate sexual
acts, including vaginal or anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, anal-
ingus, and masturbation, where penetration, manipulation, or ejacula-
tion of the genitals is clearly visible."' 133
Although this might eliminate some of the more hard-core mate-
rial, it does nothing to remedy the more widespread and perhaps more
serious problem of the sexual humiliation and degradation of women in
pornographic materials. MacKinnon also makes the rather cynical ob-
servation that the reason the Court reacted so strongly in the Ferber
case is due to the fact that the sexually explicit material in that case
depicted homosexual acts between two young boys, rather than hetero-
sexual or lesbian conduct involving women (or more specifically in this
case, girls).134  Another author proposes an ordinance to directly ad-
dress the issue of violent pornography,' 5 but the same limitations apply
restrictions on nude dancing); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding restriction on commercial speech); City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance regulating location of adult theatres).
133. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 272, proposing a new hard core pornography statute or
ordinance:
No person with knowledge of the character of the material shall knowingly distribute or
exhibit, to the public or for commercial purposes, any hard-core pornography.
Hard-core pornography means any material or performance that explicitly depicts ulti-
mate sexual acts, including vaginal or anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, analingus,
and masturbation, where penetration, manipulation, or ejaculation of the genitals is
clearly visible.
Id.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 339 & n.56. "But so far it is only with children,
usually male children, that courts consider that the speech of pornographers was once someone
else's life." [emphasis in original] "Two boys masturbating with no showing of explicit force dem-
onstrates the harm of child pornography ...while shoving money up a woman's vagina, among
other acts, raises serious questions of 'regulation of "conduct" having communicative element' .
Id. (citations omitted)
135. See Pollard, supra note 22, at 155. The proposed ordinance reads as follows:
I. Definitions.
(a) Violent pornography shall mean a film that concurrently depicts both
sexual explicitness and physically violent acts between or among those en-
gaged in the sexual activity.
(b) Sexual explicitness shall mean:
1) human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal,
2) acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or sodomy, or
3) fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region,
buttock, or female breast;
(c) Physically violent acts shall mean:
I) assault,
2) battery,
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:455
to this solution as well. While such a law would certainly reduce the
availability of some of the most troubling material, it does not reach
the more fundamental questions of what pornography in its other forms
does to the self-image of women and to men's vision of women.
C. Feminism
As indicated below, I do believe that women are uniquely quali-
fied, if not essentially required, to decide certain types of legal issues. I
will describe two areas where I think this is true, and then I will pro-
ceed to discuss why I believe it applies to pornography.
Although I do not consider myself to be a feminist in the "differ-
ence" mode, I find the ideas proposed by Carol Gilligan and the differ-
3) murder,
4) rape,
5) torture, or
6) coercion by physical force.
I1. Violations. The following acts will be violations of this ordinance:
(a) Production. It shall be a violation to participate in any capacity in the
production of violent pornography. Participation means:
I) filming,
2) directing,
3) acting (playing a role in the film),
4) coercing another to play a role in the film,
5) creating manuscripts for production,
6) editing films,
7) knowingly supplying the financial backing for producing the film,*
8) knowingly supplying the studio or other place where the film is to
be made,* or
9) knowingly supplying actors for such films, such as an agent, or
parent or relative of a minor;*
(*The standard for knowledge shall be the "reasonable person" stan-
dard, i.e., the defendant knew or should have known.)
(b) Trafficking. It shall be a violation to deal in violent pornography. Dealing
means:
1) selling films,
2) buying films,
3) exhibiting films, or
4) distributing films.
Ill. Sanctions. The following criminal and civil actions apply to the foregoing violations:
(a) Criminal sanctions. It shall be a crime to violate this ordinance. Penalties
shall be determined by the appropriate legislative bodies.
(b) Civil actions. A civil action is created and treble damages shall be
awarded for torts such as assault, and false imprisonment that occur in pro-
duction of the film.
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ence or social feminists intriguing."' I do believe that in current West-
ern culture, women (as a group) about a variety of issues. I also agree
with the general proposition that what we currently identify as the
more feminine way of thinking about issues is a more moral one, the
higher ethical road. That is, "feminine" values are identified with com-
munity, connectedness, and with attempting to find a compromise solu-
tion that will be fair to all parties. "Masculine" values are associated
with individuality, competition, and with finding solutions that tend to
result in a clear winner and a clear loser. 13 7
As an example, consider the subject of abortion. I will not presume
to try to resolve the basically unresolvable debate.in this discussion. I
think reasonable minds can differ about the fundamental question. I
can respect both the argument that abortion is part of the mother's
basic right to privacy, and the argument that a fetus is a living human
being so that a decision to terminate that life involves more essential
issues than simply the mother's right to privacy. I can also respect the
intermediate position taken by Mary Ann Glendon that the Europeans
have the right idea: maybe we should permit abortion, but should be
careful about how and when and why we permit it, and about what
kind of "message" we are sending with that decision.13 8
In any event, I believe that the ultimate decision about what we do
about abortion should be made by women, or more accurately, with an
eye toward the feminine perspective. Personally, I agree with Gloria
136. To the contrary, I consider myself to be a feminist of both the "sameness/assimilation-
ist" school and the "fem-crit" dominance/power deconstruction school.
Carol Gilligan's book, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) is credited with creating or ingpiring a new
type of feminism, sometimes called "difference," "cultural" or "social" feminism. Gilligan is a
psychologist, not a lawyer or law professor, but her ideas that men and women are intrinsically
different, that they should be treated differently and the differences show female moral superiority
received a good deal of attention in the legal scholarship community. Gilligan did not invent the
idea of "difference," but her study gave it a push into the public eye. For discussions of feminism,
see Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an
Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); West, supra note 82; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH L. REV. 797 (1989).
137. Robin West explains the concept very thoroughly in her article. See West, supra note
82, at 13-28.
138. See MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). "The
mores, not the law, are the best protection of the weak and dependent. A law which communicates
that abortion is a serious moral issue and that the fetus is entitled to protection will have a more
beneficial influence on behavior and opinion, even though it permits abortion under some-even
many- circumstances, than a law that holds fetal life to be of little or no value and abortion to
be a fundamental right." Id. at 61.
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Steinem's often-quoted source that if men could get pregnant, abortion
would be a sacrament. 131 Although the opinions of men need to be in-
corporated into the decision, men are simply not competent to be the
final arbiters in this area. Men do not get pregnant and give birth to
children-women do-and there is no changing that truth now or in
the (near) future. 140 The fact that five old men could make the recent
irrational decision that, although the right to an abortion is a constitu-
tionally protected right, the federal government may refuse to allow
recipients of federal aid to discuss it with pregnant women, 41 is at once
ludicrous and sad.
A second example has arisen in the context of the use of the bat-
tered women's syndrome as part of a self-defense claim in a murder
case. Many other authors and I myself have proposed that the woman
who is abused by her mate and who later strikes back at him with
deadly force should have her actions evaluated under a reasonable wo-
man standard." 2 The question the jury should decide is what would a
reasonable woman (rather than a reasonable person) do under these
circumstances? The reasonable man or reasonable person standard is
arguably so inherently a male standard that it cannot be fairly applied
to a female in the situation of a battered woman. For example, women
are usually smaller and physically weaker than men. In our culture,
women are often financially dependent on men. Many women are emo-
tionally dependent on their male mate. As a result of these feminine
characteristics, some actions allegedly taken in self-defense may not
139. The quote is attributed to a female taxi-cab driver in Steinem's book, GLORIA
STEINEM. OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 8 (1983). See also her essay in the
same book, If Men Could Menstruate, 337-40.
140. See Ann C. Scales, Towards A Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1980-81).
"The need for a feminist jurisprudence is focused most sharply by the issue of pregnancy. In the
words of one commentator, pregnancy is 'the final and decisive battleground' in the struggle for
just treatment of both sexes." I also found Susan Moller Okin's comments on "false-gender neu-
trality" to be pertinent here. See SUSAN M. OKIN. JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY lO-13, 101-
09 (1989). "[Mluch of the real experience of 'persons,' so long as they live in gender-structured
societies, does in fact depend on what sex they are." Id. at 11.
141. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991). See also, Int'l Union, United Automo-
bile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., I I I S.
Ct. 1196 (1991). This case was decided two months before Rust v. Sullivan and holds that an
employer may not exclude fertile female employees from certain jobs because of its concern for
the health of a potential fetus.
142. See Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Self-Defense and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1988). See also Phyllis L.
Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985).
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seem to be objectively reasonable in the traditional (male) sense, but
may be perfectly reasonable when viewed from the female point of
view.
Other examples come to mind: the crime of rape (and any de-
fenses), the problem of sexual harassment, and issues surrounding
childbearing and the workplace. Courts have often dealt with these is-
sues from the traditional (read masculine) viewpoint. I think that all of
these legal problems are uniquely women's problems, and again, should
be evaluated and hopefully resolved with a woman's view in mind.
I do not mean to overstate my position, it is not my point that men
should be totally excluded from the process. Besides, I do not think it
would be possible to do so in any case. But I do believe that it is neces-
sary to attempt to look at these issues from a viewpoint that is com-
pletely different from where we, as lawyers, tend to look. Law school
changes one's way of reasoning, but in teaching students to think like
lawyers, we ultimately teach them to think like men lawyers. As a law
professor, I am aware of this, and to a certain extent it cannot be
helped since we are, after all, training people to enter the existing
world of law and the legal system. However, we also teach students
with an eye to the future, and hopefully are able also to instill a sense
of flexibility in their patterns of reasoning. In these areas, for these
uniquely female issues and concerns, I am calling on that flexibility.
In short, I believe (although I do not know) that the average wo-
man would find hard-core and violent pornography to be evil, reprehen-
sible, and would think that it should be subject to regulation (particu-
larly in light of the uncertainty of the evidence concerning coercion to
participate in the making of pornographic materials, as well as the link
between violent pornography and similar conduct). I think that she
would find this to be true, regardless of whether the material would be
considered to be legally obscene. Using some of the social feminists'
analysis, it is possible to arrive at solutions to problems such as pornog-
raphy that do not necessarily result in a "winner-take-all" situation. It
is difficult, but not impossible, to get beyond our traditional notions of
what is absolutely protected speech, and what is not. In a way, speech
issues are easier than other constitutional questions because the Court
has already made significant exception to the blanket prohibition of any
restriction on speech or expressive conduct.143
At least one other feminist author has taken a similar position.
143. See the cases cited supra note 132.
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She argues that we adopt a "communitarian" approach to the problem
of pornography and embrace the concept of equal respect. The commu-
nitarian's theory of law strives toward a group or social ideal of solidar-
ity. Rather than advance individualistic goals, broader community
objectives are stressed. The idea of equal respect is that we should pro-
tect individual membership in the group and protect individual dignity.
She argues that some forms of pornography are so hateful and so ex-
treme that they violate the concepts of equal respect, and should be
restricted.144 As she so effectively points out, the problem is that
"[m]isogyny often expresses itself most powerfully in sexual terms."'4 5
However, any communitarian approach has at least one of the
problems of the liberal view. As one author cautioned about feminism
and communitarianism: "Theories of justice that depend on traditions
or on shared meanings-even if their intent is to be critical-cannot
deal adequately with the problem of domination.1 146
I do not propose that the test for resolving these questions be a
"reasonable" woman or an "average" woman standard. I do propose
that we look at issues that typically affect women more seriously than
men in a different light. I suggest that we try to come up with ways of
resolving conflicts that neither pit women against men, nor take unfair
advantage of women. In order to see how women would respond to
these significant questions, we have to ask them, and we have to listen
to the answers. That means getting women involved in a meaningful
way in decision-making at all levels of our society. I would paraphrase
MacKinnon and argue most of our current legal constructs are
"gendered to the ground,"' 47 but it is not realistic to throw the entire
system out the window. What I think is realistic is to look at changing
legal rules, (and thus gender perceptions and traditional sex roles) area
by area, issue by issue, rule by rule.
I think it would be premature to propose a specific statute, rule or
solution at this juncture. We need to strive to incorporate women's
viewpoints into the decision-making process and at a stage that is early
enough to be meaningful. We then need to pay attention to what we
find and to try to devise new legal rules, and, if necessary, new legal
144. See Spaulding, supra note 85, at 150-58. In addition to the Spaulding article, see
Richard Posner's brief discussion in his book THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 414-19 (1990).
145. See Spaulding, supra note 85, at 163.
146. See Okin, supra note 140, at 72.
147. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 326. "[S]exuality itself is a social construct,
gendered to the ground." Id.
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systems to implement ideas and solutions that incorporate the unique
perspective of women.

